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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DOMESTIC LAW FOCUSING
ON U.S. LAW, WITH SOME
REFERENCE TO ISRAELI LAW
Malvina Halberstam*
It is a great honor and privilege to be here to participate in the
celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court of
Israel and the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. I have very strong feelings about both.
In Siberia and Kirgistan, where my family and I survived World
War II, we could not even have imagined the State of Israel that
exists today. To keep up our spirits, when there was no food or
heat, my mother, T]"V, would sing in Hebrew. The lines of one wist
ful song have always stayed with me, though I've never heard any
one else sing it: "Omrim yesh na aretz, Aretz kulah shemesh, Aifo
he ha'aretz, Ayeh hu hashemesh?" ["They say there is a land. A
land full of sunshine. Where is that land? Where is that sun
shine?"].^ Who would have even dreamed, in those dark days of
World War Two, that less than ten years later the State of Israel
would be established and that only fifty years after that we would
have the great State of Israel that exists today! It has served as a
refuge for millions of Jews from every corner of the world, fulfilling
the prophecies of Yeshayahu and Yermiyahu. It has not only sur
vived, but has thrived, despite constant attacks by its enemies.
That it has done so as a democracy, and has succeeded in preserv
ing fundamental human rights to the extent that it has, is a credit to
Israel and a tribute to its courts.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights^ is one of the
great documents in the history of humankind. It proclaims that the
individual has rights. The right to "life, liberty and security of per
son;"^ "to equal protection of the law;'"* and "to an effective rem* Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. This address
was given at the Jubilee Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Israeli Supreme Court
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was held in Jerusalem, Israel, July
5-7, 1998.
1 Author's translation.
2 See G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
3 Id. art. 3.
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edy before a competent national tribunal. It provides that "no
one shall be held in slavery;'"^ "no one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or pimishment;"^ and
"no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest."® Although at the
time of its adoption it did not create legally binding rights,' it was
the basis for the Covenants that did create such rights. But, per
haps even more importantly, it was the basis for a revolution in the
way individual rights are viewed by international law. At the time
of its adoption, it was generally agreed that only states had rights
under international law. Today, it is universally accepted that indi
viduals have rights which the state cannot take away.
It is appropriate that the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the fiftieth anni
versary of the Supreme Court of Israel are combined in this Con
ference. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
State of Israel were dreams fifty years ago; both are realities today
far beyond the hopes of their dreamers.
I have been asked to address international human rights and do
mestic law. I will do so focusing primarily on U.S. law, with some
reference to Israeli law.
Most of the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Some are
specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Civil War
amendments; others are based on judicial interpretation of the
Constitution. Indeed, Eleanor Roosevelt, who was the driving
force behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, based it
on the Bill of Rights.
^ Id. art. 7.
5 Id. art. 8.
® Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 5.
® Id. art. 9.
' On presenting the Declaration to the U.N. General Assembly, Eleanor Roosevelt
said,
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that
we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a treaty; it
is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement
of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of human
rights and freedoms ... to serve as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples of all nations.
General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Human Rights: Statement by Mrs. Franklin D
Roosevelt, 19 DEP'T ST. BULL. 751 (1948) (emphasis added). See also Dean Rusk, A Com
ment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311, 313 (1981).
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United States law goes far in protecting individual rights, perhaps
further than the laws of any country in the world. I had long as
sumed that Israeli law was similar to U.S. law insofar as fundamen
tal freedoms are concerned. Following the Oslo accords, and
particularly following the tragic assassination of Prime Minister
Rabin, I discovered that that was not true - at least with respect to
freedom of speech. There were restrictions on expression and on
demonstrations in Israel that, in the United States, would clearly
violate the First Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court. I was shocked to read, for example, that the Minister of
Education warned that "educators who express extreme right-wing
views will be suspended,"^" and called on "students and parents to
report on what is happening in the schools," noting that some re
ports had already been received and some teachers were being in
terviewed by the police.^^ It brought back memories of my early
school days in Soviet Russia, when we were extolled by "Comrade
Stalin" to report our parents and teachers if they criticized the gov
ernment. Other examples included a warning by the then Attorney
General to newspapers that if they reported statements that consti
tuted "incitement" they would be held criminally liable,^^ and a
demand by the Religious Affairs Minister demanded that rabbis
who signed a statement that it is forbidden to give up any parts of
Eretz Yisrael remove their names from the document or face disci
plinary measures."
The restrictions and warnings clearly had a chilling effect on ex
pression. For example, when, at a dinner at a friend's house, sev
eral of us expressed dismay at what was happening, the husband of
one friend said in a very agitated voice, "I want you to stop talking
about this. You, Malvina, will return to the U.S. in a few days, but
my wife will remain here and may be arrested." The atmosphere
was captured in a cartoon, showing a dentist saying to his patient in
the dentist's chair, "I realize opening your mouth is dangerous

10 Batsheva Tzar and Liat Collins, Turn in Teachers Who Express Extremist Views, JE
RUSALEM POST, NOV. 15,1995.
11 Oscar Prager, Police State, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 18, 1995, at 6. (Letter to the
editor).
12 Ben-Yair Tells Media: No Quotes From Inciters, JERUSALEM POST, NOV. 9,1995, at 3.
13 Herb Keinon and Itim, Shetreet to Force Rabbis to Remove Names From Anti-Gov
ernment Ad, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 25, 1995, at 2.
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these days, but there is no other way I can treat your teeth."^"^
When I asked a young, obviously very bright, recent Israeli law
graduate whether he thought there was freedom of speech in
Israel, he replied, "Of course there is freedom of speech. It just
depends on what you say." He did not realize the irony of his
statement.
I refer to this not to criticize Israel, but to raise a cautionary note.
Every country tends to overreact in time of crisis. Even the United
States, which I consider to be one of the greatest democracies in
history, reacted to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor by put
ting its Japanese citizens into camps.^^ The Japanese-Americans
confined in these camps had done nothing wrong. Many of those
confined were second and third generation American citizens and
some had family members serving in the armed forces of the
United States. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court held this constitu
tional.^^ In contrast, Israel, to the best of my knowledge, took no
action against its Arab citizens who, according to media reports,
danced on the roofs when Saddam Hussein fired missiles at Israel
during the Gulf War. It shows remarkable self restraint and re14

JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 5, 1995.
15 Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Starts to Dust off a Dark Spot in History for All to See, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2,1998, at A6 ("In all, 10 internment camps in inland areas of California and
in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Utah and Wyoming held about 120,000 JapaneseAmericans who were interned for more than three years under Executive Order 9066,
which President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued in February 1942 in the name of national
security.").
1® Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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sped for freedom of expression for a state to take no adion against
those who publidy rejoice at its imminent destruction, while that
state is literally under fire. But sadly, as already noted, Israel did
take action against Jews who spoke out and demonstrated against
the Oslo Accords, restricting their freedom of expression. Hope
fully, the Knesset will enact a basic law, or the Supreme Court will
interpret an existing law, to prevent such restrictions on freedom of
expression in the future. Every state tends to overreact in time of
crisis, but that is exactly why it is imperative that there be laws
protecting freedom of expression.
It has been suggested that U.S. law may go too far in protecting
individual freedom. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
First Amendment to protect hate speech, even incitement to vio
lence, unless there is a "clear and present danger" that it will be
acted upon.^^ As a result, the United States could not prohibit
incitement to genocide or incitement to racial discrimination, as re
quired by the Genocide Convention^® and the Racial Discrimina
tion Convention,^' respectively, and had to enter reservations with
respect to each.^° The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures^^ to
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
18 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 3(c) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
19 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, art. 4 [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention].
20 The Senate Resolution giving advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the Genocide
Convention includes the following reservation; "[N]othing in the Convention requires or
authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States." S. EXEC. REP. NO.
99-2, at 27 (1985). The Senate Resolution giving advice and consent to U.S. ratification of
the Racial Discrimination Convention states:
I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations:
(1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive pro
tections of individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accord
ingly, the United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention,
in particular under Articles 4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adop
tion of legislation or any other measures, to the extent that they are protected
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
140 CONG. REC. S7634 (daily ed., June 7, 1994).
21 The Fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
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require exclusion of evidence^^ — something the amendment does
not provide for by its terms — with the result that persons who
have committed the most horrendous crimes may go free, even
though there is incontrovertible evidence to establish their guilt.
This may happen, even though a majority of aU the judges who
consider the case conclude, as did the police officer on the scene,
that there was probable cause to search, if the Supreme Court de
cides 5 to 4 that there was not.^'^ It is difficult to see what possible
deterrent effect exclusion of the evidence under those circunistances can have. As Justice Cardozo once put it,^ "The criminal is
to go free because the Constable has blundered."^^
While the U.S. protects individual rights to a very high degree
under its domestic law, it has been very slow in ratifying interna
tional conventions on human rights. The U.S. only ratified the Ge
nocide Convention in 1988,^^ even though it was submitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent by President Truman in 1949
and was supported by almost every president. Democrat or Repub
lican, thereafter.^® One of the long-time arguments made against
ratification of these conventions was that ratification would violate
the rights of states, which, under the U.S. Constitution, regulate
much of the conduct that is the subject of these conventions. How
ever as far back as 1920, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Missouri
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
22 Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
23 See e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
24 See, e.g.. United States v. Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In that case, ten judges - the
district judge, six judges of the court of appeals and three Justices of the Supreme C^urt
held there was probable cause, and seven judges — two judges on the Court of Appeals
and five Justices of the Supreme Court - held there was no probable cause (Justi^ Mar
shall did not participate in the decision of the Supreme Court). See id. at 430 (B ac , .,
dissenting).
25 People V. Defore, 249 N.Y. 13, 20 (1926).
26 The Senate gave its advice and consent to U.S. ratification of the Genocide Conven
tion in 1986, see S. Res. 347,99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S1355-81 (daily ed. Feb.
19 1986) but conditioned it on the enactment of implementing legislation by Congress.
Such legislation was enacted on November 4,1988, see Genocide
tion Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100-606,102 Stat. 3045 (1988) (rodified at
18 U S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1988)), and the Convention was ratified by President Reagan on
November 14,1988, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 367 (1996) (entered into
force for the U.S. on Feb 23,1989).
27 5ee 95 CONG. REC. 57825 (June 16,1949).
28 See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), S. fep.
No. 333,100'" Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4156,4157 (citing
Presidents Keimedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan).
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Holland,a landmark decision by Justice Holmes, that the enu
merated powers of Congress are not a limitation on the treaty
power; that the U.S. can enter into a treaty even though it deals
with matters not within the enumerated powers of Congress. Fur
thermore, Congress may then enact legislation to implement that
treaty, even if in the absence of the treaty the matter would be one
that was within the powers reserved to the states and not subject to
regulation by Congress. An attempt to change that by a Constitu
tional Amendment, the so-called Bricker Amendment,^" which
provided that "[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in
the United States only through legislation which would be valid in
the absence of a treaty,"^^ failed.
The United States has now ratified a number of human rights
treaties, including the Genocide Convention,^^ the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,^^ the Covention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination,^'' and the Convention Against Torture.^^ It has not yet ratified the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.^® That convention
has, however, been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.^^ All these ratifications have included reservations and some
commentators are very critical of the reservations.^®
V.

29 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
30 See S.J. RES. 1, 83d Cong. (1953), 99 CONG. REC. 6777 (1953).
31 Id.
32 Genocide Convention, supra note 18.
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (opened for
signature Dec. 16,1966, entered into force March 23,1976).
34 Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 19.
35 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 1904, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 35, U.N. Doc. AJ
5515 (1963), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (opened for signature Mar. 7,1966, entered into force Jan. 4,
1969) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
36 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/180
(1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980,
entered into force Sept. 3,1981) [hereinafter CEDAWJ.
32 It was first submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent by President Carter in
1980, see Letter of Transmittal by President Carter to the Senate, Exec. Doc. R, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), and again in 1994 by President Clinton, see Convention on the Elim
ination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations 21, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
38 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away
With It, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 90 (1989); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
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With respect to several conventions, the resolution giving Senate
advice and consent to ratification also includes a declaration that
the convention is not self-executing. That means that it cannot be
invoked as law in U.S. courts unless implementing legislation is
adopted.^® Such a declaration was included in the Senate resolu
tions giving advice and consent to ratification of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights^" and the Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination^^ and was proposed for the resoludon on
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against
which is still pending in the Senate. No imple
menting legislation has been adopted either for the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights or for the Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination,^^ and it is clear from the hearings that
there is no intention to adopt implementing legislation for the Con
vention on Women's Rights.'^'*
International law does not require states to make treaties selfexecuting.''^ It does, however, require states to act in good faith.''^
Women,

39 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111(3) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international
law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-self executing'
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation. ).
See also Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimina
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
'*^40^5EE^L38 CONG. REC. S4781 (April 2,1992) (statement of Senator Pell). For the text
of the Senate resolution giving advice and consent to the Covenant, see id. at '•783-84 For
criticism of the non-self-executing declaration with respect to U.S. ratification of the Cove
nant on Civil & Political Rights, see Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Poticy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993); and Henkin, supra note 38.
41 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discnmination- Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), at
13 (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State). For the text of
Senate resolution giving advice and consent to the Convention, see 140 CONG. REC. S7B34
(June 24, 1994).
.
j ,
42 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-38, at 3. For a discussion of the reservations, declarations
and understandings to CEDAW, see Halberstam, supra note 39.
43 See Henkin, supra note 37, at 347.
. yin v
44 See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Convention on the Elimination of All Foms
of Discrimination Against Women, S. REP. NO. 38, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994), p. .
45 See Louis Henkin et al.. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 140 (2d ea.
46^ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27 (1969),
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 26 ("[E]very treaty . . . must be performed . . . m good
faith.");
also Nuclear Test Cases (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 LC.J. 4,19 (Dec 20) (noting tha
good faith is "one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal
obligations").
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While most of the rights provided in the above conventions are
also protected by existing U.S. laws, to the extent that there are
rights in a convention that are not covered by existing U.S. law, the
declaration that the convention is non-self-executing, coupled with
an intent not to enact implementing legislation, raises serious ques
tions of good faith under international law.
In my view, it also contravenes Article VI of the U.S. Constitu
tion. Article VI provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States . . . and all
treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby. . . N
This language, making treaties the supreme law of the land, and the
parallel provisions in article III giving federal courts jurisdiction in
cases involving treaties, was adopted to avoid the problems that
existed under the Articles of Confederation, which had left the en
forcement of treaties to the legislatures of each of the states."^®
The history of the clause makes clear that the framers intended
treaties to have immediate effect as domestic law"*® and to be inter
preted and applied by the courts "like all other laws."^° Thus,
Hamilton wrote in the Federalists, "Treaties of the United States,
to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of
the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must like
all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determination."^^ Justice
Story wrote.
It is . . . indispensable that [treaties] should have the obligation
and force of a law, that they may be executed by the judicial
power and be obeyed like other laws. ... If they are supreme
laws, courts of justice will enforce them directly in all cases, to
which they can be judicially applied.^^
The proposition that in the United States treaties may be selfexecuting or non-self-executing is generally attributed to Justice
U.S. CONST, art. VI.
See Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 695, 699 (1995) (quoting Justice Story).
49 For a review of this history, see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 760, 761-62, 764 (1988).
50 Id.
51 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in Paust, supra note
49, at 762.
52 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
695 (1833).
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Marshall's decision in Foster & Elam v. NeilsonP However, these
terms -executing/non-self-executing) do not even appear in the
opinion. Nor did Marshall suggest that the Senate has the constitu
tional authority to provide by declaration (or reservation) that a
treaty ratified by the United States shall not be applied by the
courts On the contrary, he stressed that unlike the situation in
other states, in the United States treaties have the force of law as
soon as they are ratified and must be applied by the courts. Justice
Marshall said:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between
nations, not a
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to
be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-temtorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power ot
the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States a
different principle is established. Our constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded
in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, when
ever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision.^*
It is only where the treaty by its terms requires legislative action
that it cannot be applied by the courts directly. Marshall's position,
that treaties that require legislative action by their terms cannot be
enforced directly by the Courts, was later transformed into a rule
that in the United States treaties may be self-executing or not, de
pending on the intent of the Senate in giving advice and consent
and the intent of the President in ratifying the treaty.^^
Although it has become accepted black letter law that in the
United States treaties may be self-executing or non-self-execut
ing,®® a number of prominent scholars and commentators have re
cently challenged or questioned the constitutionality of a Senate
(self

53 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1820).
54 Id. at 314 (emphasis added); see also U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,418 (1886); Head
Money Cases 112 U.S. 580,598-99 (1884) ("A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act ot
S.I;Twhenever l,s provtoL pre^ib. . nite by wWch .he .ighu of hie pn.e.e
citizM or subject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced
in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision fm the rase before
U LT, "ohli to a
as,
50 F.3a 1567,1573 11th to. ««)
Rauscher, 119 at 418) ("Under our Constitution ... a treaty is the law of the land and the
equivalent of an act of the legislature.").
55 See Vasquez, supra note 48, at 704; Faust, supra note 49, at 767 ("Later commenta
tors have distorted [Marshall's] meaning
").
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 111.
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declaration that a treaty is not self-executing.^'^ Professor Jordan
Faust states:
The distinction found in certain cases between "self-executing"
and "non-self-executing" treaties is a judicially invented notion
that is patently inconsistent with express language in the Consti
tution affirming that "a// treaties ... shall be the supreme law of
the land."^8
Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott state:
The framers of the Constitution intended that treaties be given
direct effect in U.S. law when by their terms and context they
are self-executing. An ancillary power of the Senate to deny
self-execution contradicts this intent.^^
Professor Damrosch states:
A Senate declaration purporting to negate the legal effect of
otherwise self-executing treaty provisions is constitutionally
questionable as a derogation from the ordinary application of
Article VI of the Constitution.^
Although the Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law ap
pears to accept the validity of a non-self-executing declaration by
the Senate,®^ Professor Louis Henkin, its Chief Reporter, has re
cently written, "such a declaration is against the spirit of the Con57 See Paust, supra note 49; Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope
of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHICAGO-KENT
L. REV. 571, 631 (1991); Lori Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning
"Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 515, 51618 (1991). See also International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 89 (1980) (statement of Professor Oscar
Schachter) ("I see no reason why the United States, which has a clear constitutional provi
sion making treaties the supreme law of the land, should deprive citizens of the United
States of the advantage of that constitutional provision."); Note, The Domestic Legal Effect
of Declarations that Treaty Provisions are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 233, 233-34
(1979) ("This Note argues that the declarations [that a treaty is non-self-executing] are of
dubious validity . . . .").
58 Paust, supra note 49, at 1 (emphasis in original).
59 Riesenfeld and Abbott, supra note 57, at 599.
69 Damrosch, supra note 57, at 527. Damrosch adds, "accordingly, it should not be
sustained unless there is some constitutionally based justification for the Senate to inject
itself into the question." Id. at 527. She then proceeds to discuss and refute various argu
ments that might be made to justify a non-self-executing declaration. She concludes that
"it would be far preferable for the Senate to discontinue the device of non-self-executing
treaty declarations. . . . The effectiveness of international law would be strengthened by
eliminating this unnecessary impediment to judicial enforcement of treaties." Id. at 532.
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § lll(4)(b), and cmt. h. For a critique of the
reasoning of the Restatement, see Vasquez, supra note 48, at 707.
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stitution; it may be unconstitutional."®^ He adds in a footnote, "If
what I wrote might be interpreted as supporting a general principle
that would allow the President, or the Senate, to declare all treaties
non-self-executing, that is not my opinion.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that in the U.S. a
treaty may be self-executing or non-self-executing, it has never
ruled on the enforceability of a treaty provision which by its terms
was self-executing, but which the Senate declared to be non-selfexecuting. In Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Com
mission,^ the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held,
in a two to one decision, that a reservation that would have had the
effect of making a treaty provision non-self-executing was invalid.®®
That a practice has long been assumed to be constitutional does not
make it so, as the Supreme Court made clear in I.N.S. v. Chadha.^
In that case, the Court held unconstitutional the legislative veto,
even though it had been used in nearly 200 statues between 1932
and 1975.®^ Thus, the Court might well hold that if a treaty (or
treaty provision), by its terms, establishes rights or imposes obliga
tions that can be enforced by the courts directly, a declaration bar
ring the courts from enforcing such rights would violate Articles III
and VI of the Constitution.®®
Moreover, as the State Department acknowledges, "declaring
the Convention to be non-self-executing in no way lessens the obli
gation of the United States to comply with its provisions as a mat
ter of international law."®^ Therefore, to the extent that U.S. law is
not consistent with the Convention, and no implementing legisla62 Henkin, supra note 38, at 347-48.
63 Id. at 347 n.26.
64 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
65 The case involved a reservation in the Senate Resolution giving advice and consent
to U.S. ratification of the Niagara Waters Treaty with Canada, Treaty Relating to Uses of
Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 694, providing that "no project for
redevelopment of the United States' share of such waters shall be undertaken until . . .
specifically authorized by Act of Congress." Id. at 699. For a discussion of that case, see
Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty Is a Treaty is a Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L 51, 55-58 (1992).
66 462 U.S. at 919 (1983).
67 Id. at 944 ("The fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution.").
...
68 For a suggestion that U.S. courts could ignore such a declaration, "since it is not part
of the treaty," see RICHARD E. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 229 (2d ed.
1981). If the treaty by its terms requires legislation then the non-self-executing declaration
would not be unconstitutional; it would merely be superfluous.
69 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-38, at 49 (1994).
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tion is adopted, the U.S. would be in violation of its international
obligations. One of the purposes of Article VI, however, was to
avoid precisely that result.^"
In sum, U.S. domestic law guarantees to a very large extent
most of the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and amplified and made legally binding in the vari
ous covenants on human rights. The U.S. has, however, long re
frained from ratifying the covenants and now that the U.S. has
ratified a number of human rights treaties it has included a declara
tion, with respect to several, stating that the treaty in question is
non-self-executing. That declaration raises serious questions under
international law and under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution
and should be discontinued.
Thus, both the United States and Israel can take great pride in
the protection of human rights by domestic law, but in both further
action is essential: in the United States ratification and implemen
tation of human rights treaties, in Israel protection of freedom of
expression.

•70 See Vasquez, supra note 48, at 699.

